Introduction
Exclusion from refugee status is in a state of flux. From a time when, apart from a very few states, 1 it was used very rarely, it is now a regular feature in refugee status determination hearings. 2 The trigger for the increased use was undoubtedly the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 and the subsequent Security Council Resolutions that unjustifiably linked the granting of refugee status with terrorism. 3 However, it also allowed states to address directly those applying for status who had participated in the various armed conflicts that had become prominent from the 1990s onwards. 4 In the period after 2001, inclusion within Article 1A.2 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was being increasingly narrowed for a variety of reasons to do with migratory trends, while the scope of Article 1F seemed to be expanding to exclude ever more applicants for refugee status who would otherwise qualify for protection against refoulement. This is not to say that refugee status should not properly be confined to those not falling within Article 1F, but that Article 1F needs to be understood and interpreted in its context as part of a treaty designed to protect the rights of individuals. 5 Fortunately, more recent decisions of courts carrying out refugee status determination have shown a greater degree of nuancing in their interpretation of Article 1F.
human rights law has developed the protection regime. The paper starts by addressing exclusion in the framework of the Convention before exploring various themes arising from the case law since 2001: contextual interpretation in line with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; the consequences of return if excluded and their relevance to determining whether to exclude; exclusion by association, that is, whether membership of certain organizations can, in and of itself, justify exclusion; and, the relationship between exclusion and the UN Charter.
The 1951 Convention and Exclusion
Despite the fact that some governments have fused Articles 1F and 33.2 into one provision when incorporating the Convention into domestic law, they are two different grounds on which someone who fled persecution might lose the protection of the state that would otherwise offer it. It almost goes without saying that these two articles are only relevant with respect to someone who would be or, indeed, is within the definition of a refugee found in Article 1A.2 -if someone is not a Convention refugee, they do not need to be excluded. 6 Article 1F, known as the exclusion clause although the word 'exclude' or any derivative thereof does not appear in the article, prevents someone even qualifying as a refugee. 7 To be excluded, only "serious reasons" need to be proven that the applicant for refugee status falls within sub-paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) , that is, that s/he committed a crime against peace, a war crime, a crime against humanity, a serious non-political crime or is guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. As stated in UNHCR's 2003 Exclusion Guidelines, the standard of proof for Article 1F that is ordinarily imposed on the state where the person is seeking refugee status is not very high. 8 Indeed, at the Arusha Expert Meeting, UNHCR was prepared to accept that, 6 On the "inclusion before exclusion" debate, see Gilbert, 'Current Issues in the Application of the Exclusion Clauses' (Current Issues) in Feller, Türk and Nicholson, Refugee Protection in International Law, 2003, (Refugee Protection) pp.425-78, at pp.464-66 . See also, Expert Meeting on Complementarities between International Refugee Law, International Criminal Law and International Human Rights Law, Arusha, Tanzania, 11-13 April 2011 , paragraph 33, published in 23 IJRL 860 (2011 at p.867. 7Article 1F
1F. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that.
(a) He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes; (b) He has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee; (c) He has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. See Gilbert, (Current Issues at pp.432 et seq.) 8 See UNHCR, Background Note to the 2003 Guidelines on the Exclusion Clauses, HCR/GIP/03/05, 4 September 2003 (Exclusion Guidelines) (with Background Note), at paragraph 107, where it is opined that the 'balance of probabilities' is too low a threshold (Exclusion Background Note). See also, Gurung v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKIAT 04870 HX34452-2001 , 15 October 2002 at paragraph 95, holding that serious reasons 'implied something less than' the criminal or civil standards (not overruled on in appropriate circumstances, even an acquittal might allow for exclusion.
41. An indictment by an international criminal tribunal or court is, on the other hand, generally considered to meet the 'serious reasons for considering' standard required under Article 1F of the 1951 Convention. If the person concerned is subsequently acquitted on substantive (rather than procedural) grounds, following an examination of the evidence supporting the charges, the indictment can no longer be relied upon to support a finding of 'serious reasons for considering' that the person has committed the crimes for which he or she was charged. 42. An acquittal by an international criminal tribunal or court does not mean, however, that the person concerned automatically qualifies for international refugee protection. It would still need to be established that he or she has a well-founded fear of being persecuted linked to a 1951 Convention ground. Moreover, exclusion may still apply, for example, in relation to crimes not covered by the original indictment. 9 Given that those participating in war crimes or other gross human rights violations might fall within any of the subparagraphs of Article 1F, this paper draws on decisions based on all three.
Article 33.2, on the other hand, applies to persons who have refugee status in the state of refuge, but whose guarantee of non-refoulement is withdrawn; Article 33.2 does not challenge their refugee status.
33.2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.
Article 33.2 requires the state of refuge to show "reasonable grounds" that the Article 1A.2 refugee is a danger to the security of the country of refuge or, having been convicted of a particularly serious crime, rather than there merely being serious reasons for considering that s/he committed a serious non-political this part). As the United Kingdom Supreme Court said in R (on the application of JS) (Sri Lanka) 39. It would not, I think, be helpful to expatiate upon article 1F's reference to there being "serious reasons for considering" the asylum-seeker to have committed a war crime. Clearly the Tribunal in Gurung (at the end of para 109) was right to highlight "the lower standard of proof applicable in exclusion clause cases" -lower than that applicable in actual war crimes trials. That said, "serious reasons for considering" obviously imports a higher test for exclusion than would, say, an expression like "reasonable grounds for suspecting". "Considering" approximates rather to "believing" than to "suspecting". Cf. Oberlander v Attorney-General of Canada [2009] FCA 330 (Oberlander) , at paragraph 20. See also, the Arusha Meeting, supra n6, at paragraph 34 (p.867).
34. For exclusion to be justified, it must be established, on the basis of clear and reliable evidence, that the person concerned incurred individual responsibility for acts which fall within one of the three categories under Article 1F of the 1951 Convention. 9 Supra n6, at p.869. crime for 1F(b), s/he constitutes a danger to the community of that country. It places a heavier burden on the state now wishing to be rid of the refugee. Furthermore, given that Article 33.2 simply removes the guarantee found in Article 33.1, customary non-refoulement, which some would deem, at least in some circumstances, to be a peremptory norm of international law, is not affected. 10 While the consequence of the application of Articles 1F or 33.2 might appear to be very similar, there is a fundamental difference that explains in part some of the reaction of UNHCR to the events of 11 September 2001. Article 1F prevents a person qualifying as a refugee; the applicant does not obtain that status. Article 33.2, though, does not challenge refugee status, just its principal benefit. The travaux préparatoires to the 1951 Convention it make clear that Article 1F was drafted to ensure that only the deserving were deemed to be refugees; 11 paragraph 7d of the 1950 Statute had a similar purpose with respect to international protection through mandate status by UNHCR. As will be discussed below, the question arises as to whether Article 1F can be used as a revocation clause for a refugee who ceases to be "deserving".
Despite the fact that Articles 1F and 33.2 had been part of the Convention since 1951 and that existing domestic legislation applying the Convention had included both forms of exclusion, after 11 September 2001 states brought in new legislation that emphasised exclusion from refugee status.
Case Law since 9/11
Exclusion from refugee status has been the subject of cases in domestic courts, while human rights treaty monitoring bodies have also dealt with the potential removal of those who have applied for refugee status and been excluded under the 1951 Convention. Some of the first cases decided after 11 September 2001 suggested that the courts might prove a bulwark of protection against legislatures tightening up procedures relating to refugees so as to be seen to be doing something in the fight against terrorism. 12 However, several subsequent judgments suggested that the courts have rejected a purposive approach to interpreting the ordinary meaning of the terms 1951 Convention in their context and have restricted the protection that ought to be available to those with a wellfounded fear of persecution. Much of the subsequent case law saw judges adopt a more far-reaching application of Articles 1F and 33.2. Nevertheless, the tide seems to be turning again, with an acknowledgement that some of the previous cases need nuancing.
Interpreting the 1951 Convention in conformity with international law:
The purposive approach is no more than an acknowledgement of the obligation in Article 31 of the VCLT to give the terms of a treaty their ordinary meaning in context in the light of its object and purpose. 13 The 1951 Convention was established to provide international protection for those unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of their country of nationality for the stated reasons. As such, any limitation on such humanitarian provisions should be interpreted restrictively. Furthermore, another part of the context of the 1951 Convention is to be found in the opening paragraph of its preamble:
Considering have ceased to exist" includes cases where acts that lead to exclusion under Article 1F can, if committed subsequent to recognition, render the refugee outside the protection of the Convention. The Court also relied on Article 14 of the European Communities Qualification Directive, 17 (paragraph 23) which seems more justifiable in so far as it is recognised that Article 14 goes beyond the language of Article 1C.5 and Article 1F taken alone or combined:
14.3 Member States shall revoke, end or refuse to renew the refugee status of a third country national or a stateless person, if, after he or she has been granted refugee status, it is established by the Member State concerned that: (a) he or she should have been or is excluded from being a refugee in accordance with Article 12; (emphasis added) While it is undoubtedly the case that the strict language of Article 1F(a) and (c) does permit it to be used in relation post-entry crimes, unlike sub-paragraph (b), there are serious questions about whether that avoids, in an unwarranted manner, the specific provisions found in Article 33.2. Moreover, the attempt by the Federal Administrative Court to harmonise this within the language of Article 1C.5 is clumsy and unhelpful. As stated, all provisions of a treaty should be interpreted in line with their ordinary meaning in context according to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; for sure, applying Article 1F(a) or (c) to activities after the grant of refugee status would fit the ordinary meaning of that treaty provision, but it does not take into account the context which must include other provisions of the 1951 Convention, to wit, Article 33.2. It seems clear that anyone suspected of war crimes, crimes against peace, crimes against humanity or acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN would be regarded "as a danger to the security of the country in which he is", either because there will be direct impact on that state from the activities or it will affect the relationship of that state with another state with respect to which the refugee's activities are having an impact -it may even be that the refugee will have been convicted of a particularly serious crime, the other limb of Article 33.2 of the 1951 Convention, because the nature of these crimes is that universal jurisdiction attaches, even mandatory universal jurisdiction in the case of grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Thus, given that the refugee can be dealt with under Article 33.2 in these cases, it fits better the context of the 1951 Convention as a whole to utilize it rather than Article 1F.
The consequences of return:
Double balancing is the process whereby the courts could take into account the consequences of returning the refugee or applicant for refugee status to the country of nationality. 18 In Zaoui, 19 though, the New Zealand Supreme Court concluded that the judgment or assessment to be made under article 33.2 is to be made on its own terms, by reference to danger to the security, in this case, of New Zealand, and without any balancing or weighing or proportional reference to the matter dealt with in article 33.1, the threat, were Mr Zaoui to be expelled or returned, to his life or freedom on the proscribed grounds …. Given that Article 33.2 expressly revokes the guarantee of non-refoulement, an accepted rule of customary international law if not a peremptory norm, 20 it is even more regrettable that the Supreme Court took a narrow view of the role of decision makers, to apply Article 33.2 "on its own terms".
The German Federal Administrative Court in paragraphs 32 and 33 of its reference, 21 raised this issue, but under the Qualification Directive.
In this Court's opinion, the exclusion clauses are fundamentally mandatory, and leave the authorities in charge no room for discretion. The requirements of constituent fact are founded on an abstract proportionality test. If the requirements of constituent fact are met, it must be assumed that the individual is not deserving of refugee status. Nevertheless, the application of the exclusion clauses in a given case cannot contravene the principle of proportionality recognised in international and European law. This principle requires that every measure must be suitable and necessary, and in reasonable proportion to the intended purpose. … [Primarily] the misconduct charged against the individual must be weighed against the consequences of exclusion. Nevertheless, the ECJ went on to reject the proportionality argument. 22 If the principle of proportionality cannot be invoked, it is worth considering whether Goodwin-Gill's arguments in favour of the principle of humanity might in the future provide a fresh avenue by which to address the question of double balancing. 23 
Membership of a terrorist organization or 'exclusion by association':
The Canadian Supreme Court in Suresh 24 was dealing with the Convention Against Torture, not the 1951 Convention, but it accepted that membership alone would not necessarily suffice:
'110. We believe that it was not the intention of Parliament to include in the s.19 class of suspect persons those who innocently contribute to or become members of terrorist organizations. This is supported by the provision found at the end of s. In order to exclude persons covered by Article 1F(a) and (b), it will be necessary to show that there are "serious reasons for considering" that the serious crimes identified were committed, but it will not be necessary to attribute any one specifically to the claimant. This test applies to both Article 1F(a) and Article 1F(b).
[96] In my view, the interpretation of Article 1F(b) which the [applicant] is asking the Court to adopt conflicts with the very wording of the Article.
(emphasis added) The appellant had argued that only crimes for which extradition might be sought fell within 1F(b). While that proposition cannot be sustained, the court's view is equally questionable -Article 1F(b) speaks of there being serious reasons for considering that the applicant for refugee status "has committed a serious nonpolitical crime", not just that one can be "ascribed to him as an accomplice by association". 28 The strict literal interpretation of Article 1F should cut both ways. It should be noted that while Decary JA concurred in the result, he did so by reference to Article 1F(c) and rejected complicity by association. 29 The trusted member of the intelligence unit in the LTTE. The approach in Gurung (paragraphs 112-14) had been to focus on the organization to which the applicant for refugee status belonged and see whether it had an ultimate political agenda in line with liberal democracy or no political agenda and a focus on terrorism. JS rejected this approach of placing the organization on some sort of continuum and opted to look at whether there would be serious reasons for thinking the applicant would be guilty within the terms of the Rome Statute.
115. The starting point for a decision maker addressing the question whether there are serious reasons for considering that an asylum seeker has committed an international crime, so as to fall within article 1F(a), should now be the ICC Statute. 32 The decision maker will need to identify the relevant type or types of crime, as defined in articles 7 and 8; and then to address the question whether there are serious reasons for considering that the applicant has committed such a crime, applying the principles of criminal liability set out in articles 25, 28 and 30 and any other articles relevant in the particular case. (emphasis added) The Court of Appeal went on to look at Article 25(d) of the Rome Statute and the concept of joint criminal enterprise as expounded by the ICTY to determine the scope of guilt by association, "that is, where a crime was committed as a foreseeable way of effecting a shared criminal intent and the defendant knowingly took the risk of this happening". 33 This understanding of exclusion by association only expressly applied to Article 1F(a), but it marked a more individualistic approach more in keeping with the language of the 1951 Convention and international criminal law. When the case went to the Supreme Court, 34 they accepted the basic argument of the Court of Appeal.
30. Rather, however, than be deflected into first attempting some such sub-categorisation of the organisation, it is surely preferable to focus from the outset on what ultimately must prove to be the determining factors in any case, principally (in no particular order) (i) the nature and (potentially of some importance) the size of the organisation and particularly that part of it with which the asylum-seeker was himself most directly concerned, (ii) whether and, if so, by whom the organisation was proscribed, (iii) how the asylum-seeker came to be recruited, (iv) the length of time he remained in the organisation and what, if any, opportunities he had to leave it, (v) his position, rank, standing and influence in the organisation, (vi) his knowledge of the organisation's war crimes activities, and (vii) his own personal involvement and role in the organisation including particularly whatever contribution he made towards the commission of war crimes. With respect to involvement through joint criminal enterprise, however, the Supreme Court adopted a broader understanding than the Court of Appeal.
38. … Put simply, I would hold an accused disqualified under article 1F if there are serious reasons for considering him voluntarily to have contributed in a significant way to the organisation's ability to pursue its purpose of committing war crimes, aware that his assistance will in fact further that purpose. 35 At the Arusha Expert Meeting, 36 there was a more thorough discussion of joint criminal enterprise in comparison to aiding and abetting:
49. International jurisprudence provides guidance on the criteria for establishing individual responsibility in those cases where the commission of a crime is brought about by two or more persons, and in particular, the different forms of joint criminal enterprise (JCE). The notions of JCE I, II and III were developed primarily by the ICTY in a manner independent of domestic law, in recognition of the collective nature of the commission of the most serious crimes and the need to punish those most responsible for international crimes. By contrast, the criteria for aiding and abetting, as interpreted and applied by both the ICTY and the ICTR, are more closely related to the ways in which individual responsibility is established at national levels for persons who make a substantial contribution to the commission of crimes by others.
The first pronouncements of the ICC on issues of individual responsibility indicate a shift away from joint criminal enterprise towards greater reliance on concepts such as co-perpetration or indirect perpetration of international crimes, although it is not yet fully clear to
what extent the ICC's criteria for determining the responsibility, especially of persons in positions of authority as well as those contributing to the commission of the acts in various other ways, are different from those developed and applied by the ICTY and ICTR. Further analysis will be needed. The Expert Meeting went on to find that domestic courts are increasingly referring to decisions of the international courts and tribunals, although the simpler inchoate crimes of aiding and abetting would usually suffice.
Thus, the nature of the organization should not be determinative. Rather, what matters is the part played in the organization by the person seeking refugee status and whether that facilitated the commission of crimes or acts that fell within Article 1F. In SK (Zimbabwe), the applicant had taken part in the eviction of white farmers in Zimbabwe. In finding that this amounted to a crime against humanity, the court also looked to her specific role in the eviction.
42 The United States case of In re S-K-37 dealt with a statutorily extended understanding of exclusion through association. The BIA held that the applicant for refugee status was barred from receiving protection because she had provided material support to a terrorist organization, despite the fact that the organization in question, the Chin National Front, was seeking the overthrow of the Burmese military junta, a government that the United States government does not recognize as legitimate. As Vice-Chairman Osuna's concurring opinion put it:
In sum, what we have in this case is an individual who provided a relatively small amount of support to an organization that opposes one of the most repressive governments in the world, a government that is not recognized by the United States as legitimate and that has engaged in a brutal campaign against ethnic minorities. It is clear that the respondent poses no danger whatsoever to the national security of the United States. Indeed, by supporting the CNF in its resistance to the Burmese junta, it is arguable that the respondent actually acted in a manner consistent with United States foreign policy. And yet we cannot ignore the clear language that Congress chose in the material support provisions; the statute that we are required to apply mandates that we find the respondent ineligible for asylum for having provided material support to a terrorist organization. 38 At Osuna V-C's suggestion, the Department for Homeland Security filed a statement acknowledging that applicant was not ineligible for asylum, Congress having expressly determined that the CNF was not a terrorist organization. Nevertheless, the broad language of the material support bar remains -"the statutory language is breathtaking in its scope". 39 Finally in this section, mere presence at the scene of a crime should not be sufficient to invoke the exclusion clauses. According to cases at the end of World War II, presence was not enough on its own to justify a finding of guilt. 40 In Prosecutor v Brdjanin, 41 the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY held that to be guilty 273. The Trial Chamber might have intended to apply in this case the theory of aiding and abetting by tacit approval and encouragement. An accused can be convicted for aiding and abetting a crime when it is established that his conduct amounted to tacit approval and encouragement of the crime and that such conduct substantially contributed to the crime. This form of aiding and abetting is not, strictly speaking, criminal responsibility for omission. In the cases where this category was applied, the accused held a position of authority, through presence, the accused would have to hold a position of authority and be found to be giving tacit approval and encouragement.
Exclusion and the UN Charter -Article 1F(c)
Article 1F(c) raises interesting questions in international law. Exclusion arises where there are serious reasons for considering that the applicant 'is guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations'. Article 103 of the United Nations Charter provides:
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.
Thus, Article 1F(c) reflects this Charter-based obligation.
42
The question is whether the purposes and principles extend beyond what is found in the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter. Is it arguable that the General Assembly or the Security Council can add to the purposes and principles and thereby extend the limitation in Article 1Fc to a humanitarian provision? While academically interesting, however, there is little to be gained from exploring the issue further here, since any expansion by either organ can be explained in terms of providing a gloss to the purposes and principles as set out in the Charter-for instance, when the Security Council indicated that international terrorism was contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, it was in the context of a Chapter VII resolution passed in order to maintain international peace and security. 43 Courtesy of article 25 of the Charter, all member states are bound by Chapter VII resolutions. Thus, if a court carrying out a refugee status determination were to hold that an international terrorist was excluded under Article 1F(c), then that is foursquare within Article 1.1 of the Charter. Nevertheless. Article 24.2 of the Charter sets out that the Security Council must always act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations, in particular, Preambular paragraph 2 and Article 1.3, both of which refer to respect for fundamental human rights. That is not to say, though, that Article 1F(c) could simply be used as an anti-terrorism measure. There still needs to be careful consideration as to whether one can attribute guilty acts to the applicant. In KJ (Sri Lanka) v SSHD, 44 the court considered whether mere membership of an organization that in part engaged in acts of terrorism should exclude the applicant:
38. However, the LTTE, during the period when KJ was a member, was not … an organisation [engaged solely in terrorism]. It pursued its political ends in part by acts of terrorism and in part by military action directed against he was physically present on the scene of the crime, and his non-intervention was seen as tacit approval and encouragement. Declares that acts of international terrorism constitute one of the most serious threats to international peace and security in the twenty-first century. See also, the German Federal Administrative Court in the Dr M case, supra n16, at paragraph 35.the armed forces of the government of Sri Lanka. The application of Article 1F(c) is less straightforward in such a case. A person may join such an organisation, because he agrees with its political objectives, and be willing to participate in its military actions, but may not agree with and may not be willing to participate in its terrorist activities. Of course, the higher up in the organisation a person is the more likely will be the inference that he agrees with and promotes all of its activities, including its terrorism. But it seems to me that a foot soldier in such an organisation, who has not participated in acts of terrorism, and in particular has not participated in the murder or attempted murder of civilians, has not been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 40. … The word 'complicit' is unenlightening in this context. In my judgment, the facts found by the Tribunal showed no more than that [KJ] had participated in military actions against the government, and did not constitute the requisite serious reasons for considering that he had been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. The SSHD v DD (Afghanistan) 45 case raised Article 1F(c) questions in relation to armed conflicts. The Court of Appeal held that the attacks carried out on the Afghan armed forces were not terrorist acts. However, the attacks on the International Special Assistance Force (ISAF), which had been mandated by the Security Council to provide and maintain security in Afghanistan, were contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN and, therefore, allowed for exclusion under Article 1F(c). However, as further evidence that the courts are not prepared to let Article 1F be used as a blanket power to exclude, even here it would be a case-by-case study.
65. Indeed, fighting against UN mandated forces would appear to be a clear example of action contrary to purposes and principles of the United Nations, acting in accordance with its Charter. Military actions mandated by decision of the UN Security Council are conducted on behalf of the entire international community. The expressed purpose of the UN is to establish peace and security in the areas in which ISAF forces are mandated to operate, in order to achieve the goals set for UN involvement in Afghanistan. It does not follow that violence against anyone bearing UN colours anywhere is necessarily action contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Situations will differ and require specific analysis. (emphasis added) If the argument that Article 1F(c) should only be used against heads of state or government or their equivalents has been lost, 46 then courts carrying out refugee status determination must not let it be used so broadly that any individual could not foresee the potential consequence of loss of refugee status. Not every General Assembly or even Security Council Resolution reflects a purpose or principle of the United Nations such that acts contrary thereto automatically fall within Article 1F(c).
Human Rights Treaty Bodies and Exclusion
Almost without fail, human rights treaty bodies, when presented with the opportunity, have barred the transfer of people who would be excluded from refugee status and the protection offered by Article 33 in terms of non-refoulement. Assuming, therefore, that there is a human rights treaty body with jurisdiction, the full consequences of exclusion can be avoided.
It should be noted, though, that where it has been considered, the human rights treaty monitoring bodies have held they have no remit to review the fairness of the refugee status determination hearing. Protection, as will be seen, comes, where applicable, through the substantive human rights treaty obligations. The right to a fair trial under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is found in Article 6.
Article 6 -Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The European Court of Human Rights has consistently held that a status determination hearing is not the determination of a civil right or obligation or of a criminal charge.
47
In General Comment 32, 48 the Human Rights Committee reviewed Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The language of Article 14 is broader, referring to 'his rights and obligations in a suit at law' and might have afforded review of fair trial guarantees in cases dealing with refugee status. 49 Indeed, General Comment 32 asserts in paragraph 3 that "[the] first sentence of paragraph 1 [of Article 14] sets out a general guarantee of equality before courts and tribunals that applies regardless of the nature of proceedings before such bodies". However, General Comment 32 goes on to provide at paragraph 17 as follows:
17. On the other hand, the right to access a court or tribunal as provided for by article 14, paragraph 1, second sentence, does not apply where domestic law does not grant any entitlement to the person concerned. … This guarantee furthermore does not apply to extradition, expulsion and deportation procedures. Although there is no right of access to a court or tribunal as provided for by article 14, paragraph 1, second sentence, in these and similar cases, other procedural guarantees may still apply. , Supp.No.16, 52 (1966); 999 UNTS 171; 6 ILM 368 (1967); 61 AJIL 870 (1967) : hereinafter, ICCPR.
Article 14 1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law …. In Kwame Williams Adu v Canada, CCPR/C/60/D/654/1995, 18 July 1997, at paragraph 6.3 the Human Rights Committee found the communication inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and that it therefore did not have to decide if Article 14 applied. 50Paragraph 62 of General Comment 32 provides that Insofar as domestic law entrusts a judicial body with the task of deciding about expulsions or deportations, the guarantee of equality of all persons before the courts and tribunals as enshrined in article 14, paragraph 1, and the principles of impartiality, fairness and equality of arms implicit in this guarantee are applicablesee Communication No. 961/2000, Everett v Spain, paragraph 6.4 51 The Court will decide whether the proceedings in question, although not designated criminal, could be seen to have the characteristics of a criminal hearing, having particular regard to penalties. As was stated in Engel at paragraph 82, the Court's supervision would generally prove to be illusory if it did not also take into consideration the degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned risks incurring.
Where an applicant for refugee status can be excluded and potentially returned to a state where her/his life or freedom would be threatened because there are serious reasons for considering that s/he has committed a war crime, a crime against peace, a crime against humanity, a serious non-political crime or is guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, then there is a strong argument that the refugee status determination proceeding should be treated as a 'criminal charge against him' -unlike extradition law, refoulement would not necessarily result in a trial to determine whether s/he has committed a crime under Article 1F(a) or (b) or is guilty of 1F(c) acts, so status determination is much closer to a criminal trial with the possibility of the most serious of consequences. 52 On that basis, it is suggested that Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 14 of the ICCPR even more so should properly be engaged in cases where someone is excluded from refugee status. Interestingly, in Sufi and Elmi v UK, 53 a European Court of Human Rights case dealing with expulsion of two men seeking to prevent their return to Somalia for fear they would face persecution having allegedly committed serious offences in the United Kingdom, the Court applied its own Article 3 jurisprudence in MSS v Belgium and Greece 54 to assess whether the United Kingdom's approach under its refugee law had been correct.
Where applicable, international human rights law treaties guarantee rights to everyone within the jurisdiction of a state party, including applicants for refugee status and even excluded applicants for refugee status. In February 2008, the European Court of subjected to other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" (emphasis added) Concluding Observations on: Georgia, CCPR/C/GEO/CO/3, 15 November 2007, paragraph 7(a).
51See Engel v. The Netherlands, Series A, vol.22, at paragraph 81, European Court of Human Rights, 18 June 1976. 52On the relationship between Article 1F and extradition law, see Gilbert, (Current Issues, . While there can be no direct correlation between the political offence exemption and the meaning of serious non-political crime, they are clearly related terms. If a direct correlation were intended, one would expect to see a replication of the language in Paragraph 7(d) of the UNHCR Statute 1950 that expressly refers to extradition law. On the other hand, one of the leading British cases on the political offence exemption is a case dealing with exclusion from refugee status -see T v SSHD [1996] 13.4 … The procurement of diplomatic assurances, which, moreover, provided no mechanism for their enforcement, did not suffice to protect against this manifest risk. The Human Rights Committee in Alzery v. Sweden 57 dealt with the potential breach of Article 7 ICCPR as a consequence of expulsion, even in the light of diplomatic assurances:
11.4 … The State party in fact relied on the diplomatic assurances alone for its belief that the risk of proscribed ill-treatment was sufficiently reduced to avoid breaching the prohibition on refoulement. 11.5 The Committee notes that the assurances procured contained no mechanism for monitoring of their enforcement. Nor were any arrangements made outside the text of the assurances themselves which would have provided for effective implementation. The visits by the State party's ambassador and staff commenced five weeks after the return, neglecting altogether a period of maximum exposure to risk of harm. The mechanics of the visits that did take place, moreover, failed to conform to key aspects of international good practice by not insisting on private access to the detainee and inclusion of appropriate medical and forensic expertise, even after substantial allegations of ill-treatment emerged. In light of these factors, the State party has not shown that the diplomatic assurances procured were in fact sufficient in the present case to eliminate the risk of ill-treatment to a level consistent with the requirements of article 7 of the Covenant. The author's expulsion thus amounted to a violation of article 7 of the Covenant. This active involvement post-surrender has been reflected in a Resolution on the Transfer of Persons of the former Sub-Commission for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights. 58 55Saadi.
148. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that even if, as they did not do in the present case, the Tunisian authorities had given the diplomatic assurances requested by Italy, that would not have absolved the Court from the obligation to examine whether such assurances provided, in their practical application, a sufficient guarantee that the applicant would be protected against the risk of treatment prohibited by the Convention …. The weight to be given to assurances from the receiving State depends, in each case, on the circumstances obtaining at the material time. 4. Confirms that where torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is widespread or systematic in a particular State, especially where such practice has been determined to exist by a human rights treaty body or a special procedure of the Commission on Human Rights, there is presumption that any person subject to transfer would face a real risk of being subjected to such treatment and recommends that, in such circumstances, the presumption shall not be displaced by any assurance, undertaking or other commitment made by the authorities of the State to which the individual is to be transferred; 59 6. Strongly recommends that, in other cases, where the question of a real risk of torture arises in a particular case, no transfer shall be carried out unless: a) The State authorities effecting the transfer seek and receive credible and effective assurances, undertakings or other binding commitments from the State to which the person is to be transferred that he or she will not be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; 60 (b) Provision is made, in writing, for the authorities of the transferring State to be able to make regular visits to the person transferred in his/her normal place of detention, with the possibility of medical examination, and for the visits to include interviews in private during which the transferring authorities shall ascertain how the person who has been transferred is being treated; (c) The authorities of the transferring State undertake, in writing, to make the regular visits referred to …. Thus, it can be seen that mere paper assurances should not prove sufficient. Indeed, it is arguable that where the person would be surrendered to a State with a persistent record of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment, it is hard to believe that there could ever be a system that could provide effective, verifiable monitoring. Furthermore, obtaining diplomatic assurances for the individual to be surrendered implicitly condones the torture or inhuman and degrading treatment that is endemic in that society.
Conclusion
According to the Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh, 61 it is international law, not just the Convention Against Torture, that rejects refoulement to torture. As such, even where the refugee has committed a particularly serious crime and is a danger to the community or if he is a threat to the security of that country, he still should not be sent back to the frontiers of a territory where he would face The adequacy of such assurances must be subject to review by a court according to Turkish National Extradition Case (Case No.4) 106 International Law Reports 298 at 301. Cf. The United States handed a Guantanamo detainee back to Egypt without contacting his lawyer and he cannot now be traced, although the Pentagon did claim that appropriate assurances had been received that Sami al-Laithi would continue to be treated humanely -BBC News website 4307310.stm, 2005/10/04 09:05:20. 61Suresh. See paragraph 75: "We conclude that the better view is that international law rejects deportation to torture, even where national security interests are at stake". Cf. The New Zealand Supreme Court adopting a literalist approach in Zaoui, torture. Therefore, in early 2002 there had been reason to believe that while politicians might not have realized that the 1951 Convention provided all necessary measures to address the situation where an applicant for refugee status might have been involved in terrorism, the judges would apply the exclusion clauses restrictively, as befits a limitation on a fundamental right. 62 However, while the Tribunal in AA expressly referred to the 1951 Convention as a living document that could adapt to the needs of the times whether in terms of the exclusion clauses or protection needs, in that case by reference to terrorism as contrary to the UN's principles, the judges have tended only to use a generous interpretation where it broadens the exclusion clauses, not the scope for protecting the individual through a purposive approach. 63 The decisions of domestic courts and tribunals since 11 September 2001 placed great emphasis on the literal language of the 1951 Convention, as if the judges and adjudicators were simply applying an automatic rule with no room for discretion. There is no assumption here that judges should be neutral. One would hope that they were always impartial, but judges are part of the state structure and will defend that against threats to its existence. 64 However, the criticism is that a literalist stance is just as much a form of judicial interpretation. The judge or adjudicator has decided to apply the exclusion clause strictly and hides behind the self-proclaimed "original meaning" of the text. 65 Such an approach contrasts sharply with the more purposive approach taken towards Article 1A.2 when interpreting inclusion -for instance, why should generalized conditions in a state not amount to persecution given that the five grounds for persecution are a separate element in the test? Fortunately, more recent cases, such as JS indicate that courts are applying a stricter test generally to Article 1F that may disadvantage applicants in some respects, but which does recognize that exclusion is based on serious reasons for considering that the applicant "committed" a crime, was not just a member of an organization that commits them.
62See also, Tantoush. 63 The Tribunals in KK and AA adopted a broad approach to Article 1F(c), not limiting it, as one might have hoped, to acts by senior figures in a state given that the applicant for refugee status has to be "guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations" and those are set out in the Charter that is binding on states parties. Further, the Tribunals held that the purposes and principles of the UN were not limited to Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter, but could be extended through Resolutions. 64Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary, (Politics) at pp. 292 and 343 (1997) .
Neither impartiality nor independence necessarily involves neutrality. Judges are part of the machinery of authority within the State and as such cannot avoid the making of political decisions .... [The judges'] principal function is to support the institutions of government as established by law .... The confusion arises when it is pretended that judges are somehow neutral between those who challenge existing institutions and those who control those institutions. 65For a fuller discussion of judicial interpretation and judicial legislation, see Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication {fin de siècle}, 1997, especially Chapters 5-8. Nor should judges be allowed to justify their restrictive approach by referring to the general mood at the time. Judges do not make snap decisions, they have time to reflect and their obligation is to the rule of law, not the populace as it is for politicians.
